Remuneration report
This report is part of the remuneration
report and will be put to a non-binding
advisory vote by shareholders at the
upcoming AGM. It summarises the
company’s remuneration policy for
non-executive directors, executive
directors and prescribed officers. The
information provided in this report has
been approved by the board on the
recommendation of the remuneration
committee. The full remuneration report
is available on the company’s website,
www.barloworld.com
Remuneration philosophy
and policy
Barloworld aims to provide a level of
remuneration that attracts, retains and
motivates executives of the highest
calibre. Careful consideration is also given
to internal equity within the group and to
aligning the remuneration paid with
shareholder interests and best practice.
The vision and strategic plan for 20153,
which was approved in the 2011 financial
year, continues to be driven by the
executive team to deliver profitable
growth and enhance financial returns
throughout the various businesses. The
remuneration philosophy and metrics
incorporated into both the short-term
incentive (STI) and long-term incentive
(LTI) structures have been designed to
support this plan.
Barloworld has adopted a holistic,
balanced approach to its remuneration
philosophy for senior executives and
general staff incorporating the following
monetary and non-monetary
components:

Barloworld’s remuneration philosophy is
to ensure that executive directors and the
senior executive team are fairly rewarded
for their individual contributions to the company’s operating and financial
performance in line with its corporate
objectives and strategy. Barloworld is
committed to remuneration that is
competitive relative to the target labour
market in each country based on industry
and market benchmarks reviewed
annually by the company. This contributes
to Barloworld remaining an employer
of choice.
No material changes to the remuneration
philosophy and practices for executive
directors and prescribed officers were
made during the year or are envisaged for
the 2014 financial year.
Divisional incentive plans are aligned so
that divisional executives and
management are incentivised on similar
financial targets to executive directors,
with total incentives benchmarked against
market comparisons for equivalent levels
of management.
Governance and the
remuneration committee
Role of remuneration committee
The remuneration committee operates
under terms of reference approved by the
board, subject to annual review and in
line with King III and the Companies Act.
The terms of reference include:
| • |
Reviewing the company’s remuneration
philosophy and policy and assisting the
board to establish a remuneration
policy for directors, senior executives
and prescribed officers that will
promote the achievement of strategic
objectives and encourage individual
performance |
| • |
Ensuring that the mix of fixed and
variable pay in cash, shares and other
elements meets the company’s needs
and strategic objectives |
| • |
Reviewing short and long-term
incentive plans to ensure continued
contribution to shareholder value |
| • |
Determining all the remuneration
parameters for the chief executive (CE),
executive directors and prescribed
officers including basic salary, benefits
in kind, short-term incentives, long-term
incentives, pensions and other
benefits |
| • |
Approving the long-term incentive plan
awards for all eligible employees |
| • |
Overseeing the preparation of the
remuneration report |
| • |
Ensuring that part I of the remuneration
report is put to a non-binding advisory
vote by shareholders and engaging
with shareholders and other stakeholders on the company’s
remuneration philosophy |
| • |
Reviewing the fee proposals for the
company chairman and non-executive
directors and determining, in
conjunction with the board, the final
proposals to be submitted to
shareholders for approval. |
The remuneration committee chairman
reports formally to the board on
proceedings after each meeting and, in
line with King III, will attend the annual
general meeting of Barloworld to respond
to any questions from shareholders
regarding its areas of responsibility.
Members of remuneration committee
The remuneration committee should have
three or more members with a mix of
skills and business experience suitable for
its purpose The board may from time to
time decide the number of members on
the remuneration committee. The
members must be non-executive
directors, of whom at least half should be
independent. In line with King III, the
remuneration committee is chaired by an
independent non-executive director.
The remuneration committee is
constituted as follows:
| • |
SB Pfeiffer (chairman) (independent
non-executive) |
| • |
DB Ntsebeza (independent non-executive
and chairman of the
company) |
| • |
AGK Hamilton (independent non-executive) |
| • |
B Ngonyama (appointed with effect
from 20 March 2013 and independent
non-executive) |
| • |
SS Ntsaluba (independent non-executive). |
The CE attends remuneration committee
meetings by invitation. The CE does not
participate in the vote process, nor is he
present at meetings of the remuneration
committee when his own remuneration is
discussed or considered.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the
company’s independent adviser, attends
the meetings in an advisory capacity. The
company secretary, Ms LP Manaka, acts as
secretary to the remuneration committee.
Advisors
During the 2013 financial year, the
remuneration committee received advice
and guidance from the following
independent advisors:
| • |
PwC – standing advisor to the
remuneration committee on all
executive and non-executive remuneration matters including guaranteed pay, short-term incentives,
long-term incentives, non-executive
directors’ fees and general corporate
governance standards |
| • |
PE Corporate Services – executive salary
benchmarking and job grading. |
Overview of remuneration
Role of benchmarking
Barloworld operates the Towers Watson
global grading methodology and
structure. This assesses an executive’s
remuneration against an independently
determined grade which is based on a
number of factors including the “size” of
the job (as measured by revenue and
number of employees) as well as its
“complexity” (incorporating aspects such
as whether it is a domestic, international
or global business).
Remuneration of divisional executives and
senior management below executive
director level is also benchmarked to
independent market information based
on the Towers Watson global grading
system.
The remuneration committee approves
salary increases and incentives for executive directors and prescribed officers
on an individual basis. The salary
adjustments for other employees are
cascaded downwards throughout the
group to the appropriate heads of
divisions starting with the divisional chief
executive officer who approves the salary
increases and incentives for executives on
the divisional management boards.
Package design
Executive remuneration is heavily
weighted toward variable remuneration
as illustrated below. The on-target bonus
and long-term incentive entitlement for
the CE is slightly higher than for other
executive directors and will result in a
heavier weighting towards variable pay.
The mix between fixed and variable pay
for the CE and executive directors (based
on on-target bonuses potential and the
average indicative expected value, on
grant date, of long-term incentive awards
made during the year) is:

Elements of remuneration
The table below summarises the
composition of the total remuneration
package for executive directors and
prescribed officers during the 2013
financial year, as well as proposed
changes to the total remuneration
package for the 2014 financial year.
Elements of remuneration
| Element |
|
|
Fixed/variable |
|
|
Objective |
|
|
Policy
|
|
|
Proposed changes for 2014
|
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 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
| |
|
|
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Base salary |
|
|
Fixed |
|
|
Reflects scope and nature of
role, performance and
experience |
|
|
In most cases, benchmarked
around the median of the
market |
|
|
None |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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| Benefits |
|
|
Fixed |
|
|
Providing employees with
contractually agreed basic
benefits such as medical aid,
retirement funding and a
company car or car allowance as
per the human resource policy |
|
|
The percentage company
contribution to benefits varies
by country. In South Africa, a
14% company contribution to
retirement funds applies |
|
|
None |
|
| |
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Short-term
incentive |
|
|
Variable |
|
|
Rewards and motivates
achievement of agreed group,
divisional and individual
performance objectives |
|
|
The bonus percentages and the
performance metrics remain
unchanged from 2012. A
slightly heavier weighting was
afforded to the cash flow metric
with a corresponding decrease
in weighting given to HEPS |
|
|
No material changes to
structure envisaged |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Long-term
incentive |
|
|
Variable |
|
|
Creates loyalty and ownership
among employees and acts as a
retention mechanism. Also
aligns with shareholder interests
and long-term value creation |
|
|
Approximately 25% of the
overall long-term incentive
award comprises a retention
award and the remainder of the
award is subject to performance
targets |
|
|
No material changes to
structure envisaged |
|
Guaranteed package/base salary
The executive directors’ base salary
and guaranteed package are reviewed
annually. The current levels are
benchmarked, in most cases, around the
median of the relevant Towers Watson
grade and/or group of comparator
companies, which is made up of large
international and local South African
companies.
The company uses an independent
consultant, namely PE Corporate Services,
to conduct this exercise. The results are
also discussed with PwC, the standing
adviser to the remuneration committee.
Variations around the median may be
influenced by factors such as the nature
of the assignment, level of experience of
the executive, changes in responsibilities,
performance track record and strategic
importance of the role.
Given the
independent benchmarking performed, as
well as the comparator companies used,
this level is considered to be competitive
in the labour market where the executive
operates.
Short-term incentives
Short-term incentives (annual bonuses)
are paid in cash and are based on
achievement against 12-month targets
aimed at increasing shareholder value.
The criteria for earning a bonus are:
| • |
Personal objectives (incorporating
non-financial measures) |
| • |
Financial performance targets. |
Threshold, target and stretch performance
targets are set by the remuneration
committee annually in advance.
The remuneration committee determines
the financial measures, the weighting and
vesting levels on an annual basis. In
addition, the remuneration committee
reviews the actual performance of the
executives against the targets set at the
beginning of the relevant year. The
ultimate bonus payment is at the
discretion of the remuneration committee.
Performance targets
The financial metrics are set by the
remuneration committee on an annual
basis. These metrics are selected based on
key business drivers over the short term.
A combination of the following metrics
has been used in the past and is
envisaged to be used in future:
| • |
Operating profit |
| • |
Cash flow |
| • |
Return on Equity (ROE) |
| • |
Headline earnings per share (HEPS). |
Group targets apply in the case of the CE,
financial director, executive director:
Human Resources, Strategy and
Sustainability, and group general
manager: Finance. Divisional targets apply
for the remaining executive directors and
prescribed officers, with the exception of
HEPS which is measured for all on a group
basis in recognition of their collective
responsibility for the performance of the
group as a whole.
The targets set take into account the
current trading conditions and challenges
faced by the company or relevant division
and incorporate a meaningful level of
stretch to motivate and retain senior
employees. The threshold targets are set
at the minimum level of acceptable
performance for the business.
Personal scorecard objectives would
typically include aspects such as:
| • |
Safety performance |
| • |
Market share targets |
| • |
People development and training |
| • |
Sustainable development key
performance indicators (KPIs) |
| • |
Empowerment and transformation
objectives |
| • |
Customer loyalty and growth |
| • |
Relationships with principals |
| • |
Aftermarket growth targets |
| • |
Acquisitions and disposals |
| • |
Special projects. |
Consistent with prior years, a bonus of up
to 30% of annual basic salary can be
earned where 100% of personal
scorecard objectives are achieved. An
85% achievement of personal objectives
will result in a bonus of 22.5% of annual
basic salary. The threshold is 70%
achievement of personal objectives, in
which case 15% of annual basic salary
can be earned as a bonus. No bonus is
payable below 70% achievement. The
personal objectives component of the
scheme is the same for the CE, executive
directors and prescribed officers.
Earning levels
The percentage of basic salary eligible to be paid as a bonus based on relative
achievement against targets (threshold, target and stretch) is:
CE
| Performance metric |
|
|
Threshold
% |
|
|
Target
%
|
|
|
Stretch
%
|
|
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
| Operating profit |
|
|
7.5 |
|
|
22.5 |
|
|
36.0 |
|
| Cash flow |
|
|
5.0 |
|
|
15.0 |
|
|
24.0 |
|
| ROE |
|
|
5.0 |
|
|
15.0 |
|
|
24.0 |
|
| HEPS |
|
|
7.5 |
|
|
22.5 |
|
|
36.0 |
|
| Bonus based on financial targets |
|
|
25 |
|
|
75 |
|
|
120 |
|
| Bonus based on personal scorecard
objectives |
|
|
15 |
|
|
22.5 |
|
|
30 |
|
| Total bonus |
|
|
40 |
|
|
97.5 |
|
|
150 |
|
Executive directors and prescribed officers
| Performance metric |
|
|
Threshold
% |
|
|
Target
%
|
|
|
Stretch
%
|
|
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
| Operating profit |
|
|
7.5 |
|
|
18.0 |
|
|
28.5 |
|
| Cash flow |
|
|
5.0 |
|
|
12.0 |
|
|
19.0 |
|
| ROE |
|
|
5.0 |
|
|
12.0 |
|
|
19.0 |
|
| HEPS |
|
|
7.5 |
|
|
18.0 |
|
|
28.5 |
|
| Bonus based on financial targets |
|
|
25 |
|
|
60 |
|
|
95 |
|
| Bonus based on personal scorecard
objectives |
|
|
15 |
|
|
22.5 |
|
|
30 |
|
| Total bonus |
|
|
40 |
|
|
82.5 |
|
|
125 |
|
Long-term incentives
The company operates the following
long-term incentive plans:
| • |
Forfeitable share plan (FSP) |
| • |
Share appreciation right scheme (SARs) |
| • |
Share option scheme (SOS), no longer
in use. |
It is essential for the group to retain skills
over the longer term and to motivate and
incentivise executive directors and other
senior employees to drive sustainable
value creation over multiple reporting
periods and to be shareholders of the
company. This is achieved through
long-term incentive plans and annual
awards using the FSP and SARs scheme.
In the case of the executive directors and
prescribed officers, the FSP is 25%
retention driven and 75% performance
driven and the SARs is 100%
performance driven.
An aggregate limit of 22 744 049 (twenty
two million, seven hundred and forty four
thousand and forty nine) shares equating
to approximately 10% of the current
issued share capital of the company
applies to the FSP, SARs and SOS. The
maximum number of unvested FSP
awards which may be made to any one
participant is 568 601 and the maximum
number of unvested SARs granted to any
one participant may not exceed 1% of
the issued ordinary share capital of the
company.
A total of 8 888 167 shares have been
issued to date in respect of the FSP and
SOS representing 3.8% of the current
issued share capital. There are no options
outstanding under the SOS. Since 2010,
FSPs have been settled via on-market
purchases of company shares. It is the
current intention to settle equity-settled
SARs in the same manner in order to
avoid shareholder dilution.
A reconciliation of opening balance as at
1 October 2012 and closing balance as at
30 September 2013 can be found on of the annual financial
statements.
On an annual basis, the remuneration
committee determines the quantum of
awards to be made, the performance
targets, and the mix of instruments to be
granted to eligible employees.
Forfeitable share plan (FSP)
Barloworld uses the FSP as an incentive
tool for long-term value creation as well
as for retention purposes. The purpose of
the FSP is to provide senior executives
with the opportunity to acquire shares in
Barloworld, ensure that key skills are
retained and align the interest of
participants with shareholder interests.
Non-executive directors are not eligible to
participate in the FSP.
Awards are structured as forfeitable
share awards. This means that
participants receive shares (including
dividend and voting rights) on the date
of award but those shares are subject to
restrictions and a risk of forfeiture during
a three-year vesting period. In respect of
executive directors, the vesting of the
majority of the forfeitable share award is
subject to the satisfaction of performance
targets. To the extent that the
performance targets are not achieved,
those shares subject to the targets will be
forfeited and there will be no
re-testing of the performance targets. The
performance targets are measured over
a three-year period.
Performance targets
The performance targets applicable to the
FSP are determined and set by the
remuneration committee annually. These
performance targets are elected based on
key business drivers over the long term.
The following performance targets have
been used and are envisaged to be used
in future
| • |
Total shareholder return (TSR) |
| • |
Headline earnings per share (HEPS) |
| • |
Return on net operating assets
(RONOA). |
The above targets are consistent with
prior years except for the return on net
assets (RONA) condition which was
replaced by RONOA in order to ensure
focus on returns on operating assets
under management’s control and to
facilitate benchmarking with peer
companies.
All the awards are subject to continued
employment until the vesting date.
Awards subject to performance targets
vest according to the achievement of
targets as follows (linear vesting occurs
between thresholds and target).
Performance targets
| |
|
|
Below
threshold
(vesting %) |
|
|
Threshold
(vesting %) |
|
|
Target
(vesting %) |
|
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
| Continued employment condition |
|
|
25 |
|
|
25 |
|
|
25 |
|
| Performance targets |
|
|
0 |
|
|
22.5 |
|
|
75 |
|
| Total vesting |
|
|
25 |
|
|
47.5 |
|
|
100 |
|
Share appreciation rights scheme (SARs)
The SARs was developed with the
objective of enabling employees to
benefit from growth in the value of the
ordinary shares of Barloworld. The SARs
are subject to a three, four and five-year
vesting period. All SARs will lapse if not
exercised within six years from date of
grant. The first four awards (2006 to
2009) were cash-settled. From 2011,
awards made under the SARs will be
equity-settled. From 2007 the entire
SAR award has been subject to a
performance target.
Performance targets
In the case of the SARs there is an
inherent performance condition in that
they are granted at a strike price equal to
the current share price at date of issue
and recipients therefore only benefit to
the extent of future appreciation in the
share price. They are also subject to an
additional performance condition as
determined by the remuneration
committee. HEPS have been used
historically for this purpose and will be
used in future.
Share option scheme (SOS)
No share options have been granted since
2004 under the SOS and all options have
matured during the 2013 financial year.
Executive contracts
Executive directors are subject to
indefinite term service contracts to normal
retirement age with a notice period of six
months and nine months in the case of
the group CE.
The main terms of the service contracts
applicable to executive directors can be
summarised as follows:
Executive contracts
| Provision |
|
|
Policy |
|
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
| |
|
|
|
|
| Contract term |
|
|
Indefinite (or until normal retirement age in the relevant jurisdiction) subject to specified notice periods by
the executive and the company |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| Notice period |
|
|
Nine months for the group CE and six months for executive directors |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| Remuneration |
|
|
Salary
Car benefit
Retirement fund
Medical aid
Eligible to participate in annual short-term incentive plan (subject to rules of plan)
Eligible to participate in the FSP and SAR (subject to rules of plan) |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| Termination of employment and
change of control payments and/
or automatic vesting of long-term
incentives |
|
|
Change of control clauses are included in FSP and SAR rules and allow for proportionate vesting of
awards. Change of control clauses in employment contracts provide for redundancy terms, based on
established guidelines, in the event of termination of employment within six months of change of control |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| Restraint of trade |
|
|
Not applicable |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| Other benefits |
|
|
Certain executives directors may be employed in terms of expatriate contracts which include typical
expatriate benefits in addition to the standard benefits |
|
Non-executive directors
The appointment of non-executive
directors (NEDs) is governed by a letter of
appointment that sets out, among other
things, the term of appointment, duties
and responsibilities, fees and other
payments, and termination of services.
NEDs receive standard fees for their
services on the board and board
committees. The remuneration committee
reviews the level of fees and makes
recommendations to the board for
consideration. A benchmarking exercise
was conducted in November 2013 by
PwC, the company’s independent
remuneration advisor. In terms of
Barloworld’s memorandum of
incorporation, fees payable to NEDs must
be approved by shareholders in general meeting. The current level of fees payable
to non-executive directors was approved
by Barloworld’s shareholders at the
annual general meeting held on
23 January 2013.
Proposed fees for 2014 are set out in the
notice to the annual general meeting on
page 6 of the AGM booklet.
|