Remuneration report

This report is part of the remuneration report and will be put to a non-binding advisory vote by shareholders at the upcoming AGM. It summarises the company’s remuneration policy for non-executive directors, executive directors and prescribed officers. The information provided in this report has been approved by the board on the recommendation of the remuneration committee. The full remuneration report is available on the company’s website, www.barloworld.com

Remuneration philosophy and policy

Barloworld aims to provide a level of remuneration that attracts, retains and motivates executives of the highest calibre. Careful consideration is also given to internal equity within the group and to aligning the remuneration paid with shareholder interests and best practice.

The vision and strategic plan for 20153, which was approved in the 2011 financial year, continues to be driven by the executive team to deliver profitable growth and enhance financial returns throughout the various businesses. The remuneration philosophy and metrics incorporated into both the short-term incentive (STI) and long-term incentive (LTI) structures have been designed to support this plan.

Barloworld has adopted a holistic, balanced approach to its remuneration philosophy for senior executives and general staff incorporating the following monetary and non-monetary components:

Remuneration philosophy and policy

Barloworld’s remuneration philosophy is to ensure that executive directors and the senior executive team are fairly rewarded for their individual contributions to the company’s operating and financial performance in line with its corporate objectives and strategy. Barloworld is committed to remuneration that is competitive relative to the target labour market in each country based on industry and market benchmarks reviewed annually by the company. This contributes to Barloworld remaining an employer of choice.

No material changes to the remuneration philosophy and practices for executive directors and prescribed officers were made during the year or are envisaged for the 2014 financial year.

Divisional incentive plans are aligned so that divisional executives and management are incentivised on similar financial targets to executive directors, with total incentives benchmarked against market comparisons for equivalent levels of management.

Governance and the remuneration committee

Role of remuneration committee

The remuneration committee operates under terms of reference approved by the board, subject to annual review and in line with King III and the Companies Act.

The terms of reference include:

• Reviewing the company’s remuneration philosophy and policy and assisting the board to establish a remuneration policy for directors, senior executives and prescribed officers that will promote the achievement of strategic objectives and encourage individual performance
• Ensuring that the mix of fixed and variable pay in cash, shares and other elements meets the company’s needs and strategic objectives
• Reviewing short and long-term incentive plans to ensure continued contribution to shareholder value
• Determining all the remuneration parameters for the chief executive (CE), executive directors and prescribed officers including basic salary, benefits in kind, short-term incentives, long-term incentives, pensions and other benefits
• Approving the long-term incentive plan awards for all eligible employees
• Overseeing the preparation of the remuneration report
• Ensuring that part I of the remuneration report is put to a non-binding advisory vote by shareholders and engaging with shareholders and other stakeholders on the company’s remuneration philosophy
• Reviewing the fee proposals for the company chairman and non-executive directors and determining, in conjunction with the board, the final proposals to be submitted to shareholders for approval.

The remuneration committee chairman reports formally to the board on proceedings after each meeting and, in line with King III, will attend the annual general meeting of Barloworld to respond to any questions from shareholders regarding its areas of responsibility.

Members of remuneration committee

The remuneration committee should have three or more members with a mix of skills and business experience suitable for its purpose The board may from time to time decide the number of members on the remuneration committee. The members must be non-executive directors, of whom at least half should be independent. In line with King III, the remuneration committee is chaired by an independent non-executive director.

The remuneration committee is constituted as follows:

• SB Pfeiffer (chairman) (independent non-executive)
• DB Ntsebeza (independent non-executive and chairman of the company)
• AGK Hamilton (independent non-executive)
• B Ngonyama (appointed with effect from 20 March 2013 and independent non-executive)
• SS Ntsaluba (independent non-executive).

The CE attends remuneration committee meetings by invitation. The CE does not participate in the vote process, nor is he present at meetings of the remuneration committee when his own remuneration is discussed or considered.

PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the company’s independent adviser, attends the meetings in an advisory capacity. The company secretary, Ms LP Manaka, acts as secretary to the remuneration committee.

Advisors

During the 2013 financial year, the remuneration committee received advice and guidance from the following independent advisors:

• PwC – standing advisor to the remuneration committee on all executive and non-executive remuneration matters including guaranteed pay, short-term incentives, long-term incentives, non-executive directors’ fees and general corporate governance standards
• PE Corporate Services – executive salary benchmarking and job grading.

Overview of remuneration

Role of benchmarking

Barloworld operates the Towers Watson global grading methodology and structure. This assesses an executive’s remuneration against an independently determined grade which is based on a number of factors including the “size” of the job (as measured by revenue and number of employees) as well as its “complexity” (incorporating aspects such as whether it is a domestic, international or global business).

Remuneration of divisional executives and senior management below executive director level is also benchmarked to independent market information based on the Towers Watson global grading system.

The remuneration committee approves salary increases and incentives for executive directors and prescribed officers on an individual basis. The salary adjustments for other employees are cascaded downwards throughout the group to the appropriate heads of divisions starting with the divisional chief executive officer who approves the salary increases and incentives for executives on the divisional management boards.

Package design

Executive remuneration is heavily weighted toward variable remuneration as illustrated below. The on-target bonus and long-term incentive entitlement for the CE is slightly higher than for other executive directors and will result in a heavier weighting towards variable pay. The mix between fixed and variable pay for the CE and executive directors (based on on-target bonuses potential and the average indicative expected value, on grant date, of long-term incentive awards made during the year) is:

Package design

Elements of remuneration

The table below summarises the composition of the total remuneration package for executive directors and prescribed officers during the 2013 financial year, as well as proposed changes to the total remuneration package for the 2014 financial year.

Elements of remuneration

Element     Fixed/variable     Objective     Policy
    Proposed changes for 2014
 
                           
Base salary     Fixed     Reflects scope and nature of role, performance and experience     In most cases, benchmarked around the median of the market     None  
                           
Benefits     Fixed     Providing employees with contractually agreed basic benefits such as medical aid, retirement funding and a company car or car allowance as per the human resource policy     The percentage company contribution to benefits varies by country. In South Africa, a 14% company contribution to retirement funds applies     None  
                           
Short-term incentive     Variable     Rewards and motivates achievement of agreed group, divisional and individual performance objectives     The bonus percentages and the performance metrics remain unchanged from 2012. A slightly heavier weighting was afforded to the cash flow metric with a corresponding decrease in weighting given to HEPS     No material changes to structure envisaged  
                           
Long-term incentive     Variable     Creates loyalty and ownership among employees and acts as a retention mechanism. Also aligns with shareholder interests and long-term value creation     Approximately 25% of the overall long-term incentive award comprises a retention award and the remainder of the award is subject to performance targets     No material changes to structure envisaged  

Guaranteed package/base salary

The executive directors’ base salary and guaranteed package are reviewed annually. The current levels are benchmarked, in most cases, around the median of the relevant Towers Watson grade and/or group of comparator companies, which is made up of large international and local South African companies.

The company uses an independent consultant, namely PE Corporate Services, to conduct this exercise. The results are also discussed with PwC, the standing adviser to the remuneration committee. Variations around the median may be influenced by factors such as the nature of the assignment, level of experience of the executive, changes in responsibilities, performance track record and strategic importance of the role. Given the independent benchmarking performed, as well as the comparator companies used, this level is considered to be competitive in the labour market where the executive operates.

Short-term incentives

Short-term incentives (annual bonuses) are paid in cash and are based on achievement against 12-month targets aimed at increasing shareholder value. The criteria for earning a bonus are:

• Personal objectives (incorporating non-financial measures)
• Financial performance targets.

Threshold, target and stretch performance targets are set by the remuneration committee annually in advance.

The remuneration committee determines the financial measures, the weighting and vesting levels on an annual basis. In addition, the remuneration committee reviews the actual performance of the executives against the targets set at the beginning of the relevant year. The ultimate bonus payment is at the discretion of the remuneration committee.

Performance targets

The financial metrics are set by the remuneration committee on an annual basis. These metrics are selected based on key business drivers over the short term. A combination of the following metrics has been used in the past and is envisaged to be used in future:

• Operating profit
• Cash flow
• Return on Equity (ROE)
• Headline earnings per share (HEPS).

Group targets apply in the case of the CE, financial director, executive director: Human Resources, Strategy and Sustainability, and group general manager: Finance. Divisional targets apply for the remaining executive directors and prescribed officers, with the exception of HEPS which is measured for all on a group basis in recognition of their collective responsibility for the performance of the group as a whole.

The targets set take into account the current trading conditions and challenges faced by the company or relevant division and incorporate a meaningful level of stretch to motivate and retain senior employees. The threshold targets are set at the minimum level of acceptable performance for the business.

Personal scorecard objectives would typically include aspects such as:

• Safety performance
• Market share targets
• People development and training
• Sustainable development key performance indicators (KPIs)
• Empowerment and transformation objectives
• Customer loyalty and growth
• Relationships with principals
• Aftermarket growth targets
• Acquisitions and disposals
• Special projects.

Consistent with prior years, a bonus of up to 30% of annual basic salary can be earned where 100% of personal scorecard objectives are achieved. An 85% achievement of personal objectives will result in a bonus of 22.5% of annual basic salary. The threshold is 70% achievement of personal objectives, in which case 15% of annual basic salary can be earned as a bonus. No bonus is payable below 70% achievement. The personal objectives component of the scheme is the same for the CE, executive directors and prescribed officers.

Earning levels

The percentage of basic salary eligible to be paid as a bonus based on relative achievement against targets (threshold, target and stretch) is:

CE

Performance metric     Threshold
%
    Target
%
    Stretch
%
 
Operating profit     7.5     22.5     36.0  
Cash flow     5.0     15.0     24.0  
ROE     5.0     15.0     24.0  
HEPS     7.5     22.5     36.0  
Bonus based on financial targets     25     75     120  
Bonus based on personal scorecard objectives     15     22.5     30  
Total bonus     40     97.5     150  

Executive directors and prescribed officers

Performance metric     Threshold
%
    Target
%
    Stretch
%
 
Operating profit     7.5     18.0     28.5  
Cash flow     5.0     12.0     19.0  
ROE     5.0     12.0     19.0  
HEPS     7.5     18.0     28.5  
Bonus based on financial targets     25     60     95  
Bonus based on personal scorecard objectives     15     22.5     30  
Total bonus     40     82.5     125  

Long-term incentives

The company operates the following long-term incentive plans:

• Forfeitable share plan (FSP)
• Share appreciation right scheme (SARs)
• Share option scheme (SOS), no longer in use.

It is essential for the group to retain skills over the longer term and to motivate and incentivise executive directors and other senior employees to drive sustainable value creation over multiple reporting periods and to be shareholders of the company. This is achieved through long-term incentive plans and annual awards using the FSP and SARs scheme. In the case of the executive directors and prescribed officers, the FSP is 25% retention driven and 75% performance driven and the SARs is 100% performance driven.

An aggregate limit of 22 744 049 (twenty two million, seven hundred and forty four thousand and forty nine) shares equating to approximately 10% of the current issued share capital of the company applies to the FSP, SARs and SOS. The maximum number of unvested FSP awards which may be made to any one participant is 568 601 and the maximum number of unvested SARs granted to any one participant may not exceed 1% of the issued ordinary share capital of the company.

A total of 8 888 167 shares have been issued to date in respect of the FSP and SOS representing 3.8% of the current issued share capital. There are no options outstanding under the SOS. Since 2010, FSPs have been settled via on-market purchases of company shares. It is the current intention to settle equity-settled SARs in the same manner in order to avoid shareholder dilution.

A reconciliation of opening balance as at 1 October 2012 and closing balance as at 30 September 2013 can be found on page 84 of the annual financial statements.

On an annual basis, the remuneration committee determines the quantum of awards to be made, the performance targets, and the mix of instruments to be granted to eligible employees.

Forfeitable share plan (FSP)

Barloworld uses the FSP as an incentive tool for long-term value creation as well as for retention purposes. The purpose of the FSP is to provide senior executives with the opportunity to acquire shares in Barloworld, ensure that key skills are retained and align the interest of participants with shareholder interests. Non-executive directors are not eligible to participate in the FSP.

Awards are structured as forfeitable share awards. This means that participants receive shares (including dividend and voting rights) on the date of award but those shares are subject to restrictions and a risk of forfeiture during a three-year vesting period. In respect of executive directors, the vesting of the majority of the forfeitable share award is subject to the satisfaction of performance targets. To the extent that the performance targets are not achieved, those shares subject to the targets will be forfeited and there will be no 
re-testing of the performance targets. The performance targets are measured over a three-year period.

Performance targets

The performance targets applicable to the FSP are determined and set by the remuneration committee annually. These performance targets are elected based on key business drivers over the long term. The following performance targets have been used and are envisaged to be used in future

• Total shareholder return (TSR)
• Headline earnings per share (HEPS)
• Return on net operating assets (RONOA).

The above targets are consistent with prior years except for the return on net assets (RONA) condition which was replaced by RONOA in order to ensure focus on returns on operating assets under management’s control and to facilitate benchmarking with peer companies.

All the awards are subject to continued employment until the vesting date. Awards subject to performance targets vest according to the achievement of targets as follows (linear vesting occurs between thresholds and target).

Performance targets

      Below
threshold
(vesting %)
    Threshold
(vesting %)
    Target
(vesting %)
 
Continued employment condition     25     25     25  
Performance targets     0     22.5     75  
Total vesting     25     47.5     100  

Share appreciation rights scheme (SARs)

The SARs was developed with the objective of enabling employees to benefit from growth in the value of the ordinary shares of Barloworld. The SARs are subject to a three, four and five-year vesting period. All SARs will lapse if not exercised within six years from date of grant. The first four awards (2006 to 2009) were cash-settled. From 2011, awards made under the SARs will be equity-settled. From 2007 the entire SAR award has been subject to a performance target.

Performance targets

In the case of the SARs there is an inherent performance condition in that they are granted at a strike price equal to the current share price at date of issue and recipients therefore only benefit to the extent of future appreciation in the share price. They are also subject to an additional performance condition as determined by the remuneration committee. HEPS have been used historically for this purpose and will be used in future.

Share option scheme (SOS)

No share options have been granted since 2004 under the SOS and all options have matured during the 2013 financial year.

Executive contracts

Executive directors are subject to indefinite term service contracts to normal retirement age with a notice period of six months and nine months in the case of the group CE.

The main terms of the service contracts applicable to executive directors can be summarised as follows:

Executive contracts

Provision     Policy  
         
Contract term     Indefinite (or until normal retirement age in the relevant jurisdiction) subject to specified notice periods by the executive and the company  
         
Notice period     Nine months for the group CE and six months for executive directors  
         
Remuneration     Salary
Car benefit
Retirement fund
Medical aid
Eligible to participate in annual short-term incentive plan (subject to rules of plan)
Eligible to participate in the FSP and SAR (subject to rules of plan)
 
         
Termination of employment and change of control payments and/ or automatic vesting of long-term incentives     Change of control clauses are included in FSP and SAR rules and allow for proportionate vesting of awards. Change of control clauses in employment contracts provide for redundancy terms, based on established guidelines, in the event of termination of employment within six months of change of control  
         
Restraint of trade     Not applicable  
         
Other benefits     Certain executives directors may be employed in terms of expatriate contracts which include typical expatriate benefits in addition to the standard benefits  

Non-executive directors

The appointment of non-executive directors (NEDs) is governed by a letter of appointment that sets out, among other things, the term of appointment, duties and responsibilities, fees and other payments, and termination of services.

NEDs receive standard fees for their services on the board and board committees. The remuneration committee reviews the level of fees and makes recommendations to the board for consideration. A benchmarking exercise was conducted in November 2013 by PwC, the company’s independent remuneration advisor. In terms of Barloworld’s memorandum of incorporation, fees payable to NEDs must be approved by shareholders in general meeting. The current level of fees payable to non-executive directors was approved by Barloworld’s shareholders at the annual general meeting held on 23 January 2013.

Proposed fees for 2014 are set out in the notice to the annual general meeting on page 6 of the AGM booklet.

Full Remuneration report 2013